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IN f'HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DORIS STARZEL and 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through Office of Recovery 
Services, State Depart-
ment of Social Services, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
JOHNNY JARAMILLO, 
•. 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 18374 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to establish that appellant, Johnny 
Jaramillo, is the father of Chad Starzel, who was born out of 
wedlock on August 20, 1977, and to establish appellant's past 
and ongoing child support obligation with respect to Chad Starzel. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Default judgment was entered against appellant on 
March 11, 1982. Appellant's subsequent motion to set aside the 
default judgment was denied by the Honorable Boyd Bunnell on 
April 19, 1982. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affirmation of the trial court's 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This suit was begun by respondents in December of 
1980. Appellant's attorney at that time, Walter R. Ellett, 
served appellant's answer on the Carbon County Attorney's Office 
on December 22, 1980. Respondents_~--- first set of interrogatories 
was served upon appellant's attorney on May 20, 1980. It appears 
that· Mr-. - Ellett provided appellant a copy of the _interrogatories 
for his answer (Tr. 57). Appellant failed to answer respondents' 
interrogatories within the thirty (30) day time l~mit imposed by 
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Then Deputy 
Carbon County Attorney, Gene Strate, wrote Walter Ellett a letter 
on July 13, 1981, requesting an answer to respondents' interroga-
tories (Tr. 61). Another letter requesting a response to respondent 
interrogatories was set to Mr. Ellett by Mr. Strate on August 25, 
1981 (Tr. 61). A third letter was sent to Mr. Ellett on September 
17, 1981, by then Deputy Carbon County Attorney, Fred Howard. Mr. 
Howard requested that an answer to respondents' interrogatories be 
supplied immediately (Tr. 61). Mr. Ellett responded to Mr. Howard 
by letter dated September 23, 1981, and stated that he would be 
meeting with appellant personally to get his answers (Tr. 61, 62). 
No response was submitted so Mr. Howard wrote Mr. Ellett on 
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October 28, 1981, and advised Mr. Ellett that he intended to 
file a motion for sanctions if answers were not received within 
three (3) weeks (Tr. 62). A motion to compel discovery was 
filed with the trial court on November 30, 1981. An order giving 
appellant ten (10) days to answer respondents' interrogatories 
was entered by the court (Tr. 3). When appellant failed to answer 
respondents' interrogatories pursuant to the court's order, a 
motion to strike appellant's answer was filed. Notice of that 
motion was served upon Mr. Ellett on January 26, 1982 (Tr. 41). 
Mr. Ellett advised appellant by letter which appellant received 
on or about February 3, 1982, that he had received a motion to 
._- ., .. , : 
-=-· 
strike his answer and th~t it was imperative t~at appellant 
contact him, sirice a failure to answer respondents' interroga-
tories could result in action by the court adverse to appellant's 
interests (Tr. 57). Appellant then sought to hire another 
attorney (Tr. 57, 58). Hearing on respondents' motion was held 
February 23, 1982. Neither appellant or his attorney appeared. 
The court struck appellant's answer and authorized respondents 
to enter appellant's default. Default hearing was held on March 6, 
1982, at which time appellant was found to be the father of Chad 
Starzel. Judgment to that effect was entered against appellant 
on March 11, 1982. A motion to set aside judgment was filed by 
appellant's new attorney, Phil Hansen, on March 23, 1982. An 
order denying appellant's motion to set aside judgment was entered 
by the court on April 19, 1982. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
Appellant's motion to set aside default judgment was 
-
made pursuant to Rule 60(b){l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure which reads as follows: 
• : -·· ,J 
On motion and upon such terms as are just. 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; ... The motion 
shall be made within a-reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 
three months after the judgment, order; or pro-
ceeding was entered or taken .... 
. . ...... 
- . .; . -
On its face Rule 60(b) makes it clear that the moving 
party must show "excusable neglect" which led to the judgment 
and that application for relief was made in a timely fashion. 
This court has recognized this two-fold approach to motions under 
Rule 60(b) or its statutory predecessors, Mayhew v. Standard 
Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). 
Various policies and rules of review have been arti-
culated by this court which are to be considered in deciding 
whether or not a judgment should be set aside for excusable neglect. 
Paramount among the rules which this court has employed in the 
past is the rule that the decision of the trial court regarding 
a motion to set aside judgment under Rule 60(b) will only be 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disturbed on appeal for a manifest abuse of discretion, Heath 
v. Mower, Utah, 597 P.2d 855 (1979). 
It is true, as appellant indicates in his brief, 
that this court has additionally advised liberality in con-
struing the remedy provided by Rule 60(b) to the end that cases 
may be decided on their merits. But as the language in Warren 
.. 
... ~ ' .. 
v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), indicates 
the-policy of liberality is to be applied at the trial court 
level: 
The rule that the courts will incline toward 
.. \;~.: granting relief to a party who has not had 
the opportunity to present his case is ordin-
arily applied at the trial court lev·e1, and 
, r 1.• .. '° 7 t 
... \. .... ~· -- ) 
this court will not reverse the trial court ... 
merely because the motion could have been granted. 
See also Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 
513 P.2d 429 (1973). 
The task of the trial court upon appellant's motion 
to set aside for "mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect", 
besides determining whether appellant's motion was timely, was 
to review the facts and circumstances of the case to see if 
they supported appellant's claim of excusable neglect, Heath, 
supra. 
The meaning of excusable neglect has been addressed by 
this court in Board of Education of the Granite School District v. 
Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 (1963): 
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It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where there is 
reasonable justification for the defendant's 
failure to appear and answer. However, the 
excuse must be reasonable to constitute 
excusable neglect. (emphasis added) 
In addition this court has required that the moving party show 
he acted with due diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he has no control, Peterson 
,/' . ,. .. 
. ' 
v. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 P. 860 (1905); Helgesen v-:~--Inyangumia, 
Utah, 636 P.2d 1079 (1981). Other jurisdictions have defined 
excusable neglect as neglect that might be expected on the part 
. . . 
. 
of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. Cleek v. 
Virginia Gold Mining & Milling Co., 63 Idaho 445, 122 P.2d 232 (1942 
With regard to the showing appellant has made, it should 
be noted at the outset that appellant makes no claim, either in 
his motion and affidavit to set aside judgment, or in his brief, 
that surprise of any kind justifies opening the judgment of the 
trial court. Indeed, after a review of appellant's motion to set 
aside default judgment, his affidavit in support of his motion 
and his brief, the only language that can be found that appears 
to suggest a factual basis for appellant's motion is as follows: 
Appellant also presents a reasonable justi-
fication for setting aside the default 
judgment .... Appellant should not be judged 
by his former counsel's apparent neglect in 
getting answers to the interrogatories .... 
(Appellant's brief at 6.) 
The allegation does not seem to be one of mistake or inadver-
tence, but rather that Mr. Ellett, appellant's first attorney, 
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was negligent in failing to provide respondents with answers 
to their interrogatories, and that counsel's negligence should 
not be imputed to appellant. Though appellant makes no claim 
that Mr. Ellett's alleged negligence was excusable, the implica-
tion is clear that appellant's failure to respond to interrogatories, 
and ultimately his failure to appear for trial, was excusable 
neglect due to his attorney's actions. Whether appellant relies 
on his .own neglect, .or the alleged neglect of Mr. Ellett, he must 
show that the neglect was excusable, Peterson, supra. 
The trial court obviously decided that whatever neglect 
existed was inexcusable. The record in this case supports that 
finding. In addition, the record supports the proposition that 
.. if there was inexcusable neglect in this case it was very likely 
appellant's neglect and not that of Mr. Ellett. The second 
paragraph of appellant's affidavit in support of his motion to 
set aside states: 
That on or about the 3rd day of February, 
1982, [appellant] received a letter from his 
counsel of record, Walter R. Ellett, informing 
him that Mr. Ellett was in receipt of a motion 
to strike his answer [in the case before the 
court] because the interrogatories that had 
previously been sent to him had not been 
answered. Mr. Ellett also informed him that 
it was imperative that he contact him, since 
a failure to respond to .the interrogatories 
could result in the court entering an order 
that may not be to his best interest. (Tr. 57) 
Appellant's affidavit clearly shows that Mr. Ellett advised 
appellant of the urgency of answering respondents' interroga-
tories at least one month before default judgment was taken. It 
-7-
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also leads one to believe that Mr. Ellett had previously pro-
vided appellant with respondents' interrogatories for his 
answer. It should be pointed out that nowhere in the record 
presently before the court does ·appellant allege that Mr. Ellett 
failed to provide him with respondents' interrogatories or that 
he attempted to answer those interrogat.ories, or that Mr. Ellett 
failed to advise him of .the importance of answering those interro-
gatories. As has been indicated, the.contrary appears. 
Appellant's brief, likewise, fails to state any strong 
-justification for appellant's neglect of this case. Appellant 
tries to lay the blame for his· failure to respond to respondents' 
interrogatories at the feet of Walter Ellett: Mr. Ellett's actions 
are weakly characterized in . appellant IS brief as "apparent neglect. I . 
And as if to retract the allegation of neglect on Mr. Ellett's 
part, appellant's-brief then says: 
Present counsel feels it is inappropriate 
to emphasize the acts of prior counsel as 
an excuse for any delays, and would rather 
emphasize the pursuit with which present 
counsel has handled the case on appeal .... 
(Appellant's brief at 7.) 
- ... ' - - - . ~ :...:.. ~ 
Respondents do not contend that appellant's motion 
i J .. • _. ;~~ 
was untimely -- respondents' position,is that appellant has 
..... ,. .. ' .) 
completely failed to show facts that amount to "excusable 
neglect". Appellant's actions, in light of the warning sent 
to him February 3, 1982, by Walter Ellett, were totally unrea-
sonable. Instead bf answering Mr. Ellett, he chose to ignore 
-8-
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his letter and hire new counsel. The trial court was completely 
justified in finding appellant's neglect inexcusable. This 
court's statement in Warren is applicable to the case now before 
the court: 
In-order for this court to overturn the 
discretion of the lower court in refusing to 
vacate a valid judgment, the. requirements of 
public policy demand more than a mere statement 
that a person did not have his day in court 
when full opportunity for a fair hearing was 
afforded to him or his legal representative. 
Appellant was given more. than ample time to answer respondents' 
. ~ (. . : (, . 
interrogatories, ·and fair warning by his own attorney of the 
( 
consequences of his failure to do so. Appellant obviously could 
.... •.··· 
. 
have prevented default judgment at any time prior to judgment 
by simply responding to Walter Ellett's letter or the interroga~ 
tories Mr. Ellett sent him. He should not be heard to complain 
now that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
grant his motion to set aside judgment. 
CPNCLUSION 
Respondents are entitled to retain the benefits of 
' 
a great deal of time and effort that went into obtaining a 
judgment against appellant unless he has shown that the trial 
court abused its discretion in not granting his motion. The 
record is devoid of any showing by appellant that his neglect 
of this case was reasonable, or that he acted with due diligence, 
-9-
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or that he acted as a reasonable person would in the same cir-
cumstances. The record does show that respondent requested 
' 
answers to their interrogatories at least four times and that 
appellant had in excess of eight months to answer but failed 
to do so. Appellant's failure to_ answ~r interrogatories or 
appear at trial was inexcusable and the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
. } . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ,this J q.f.k day of March, 1983. 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
Carbon County Attorney 
- ~Carbon County Courthouse 
Price, Utah 84501 
Attorney for Respondents 
B/J?~c~ · ~cL~ RANDY A. HUDSO 
Chief D:pu;y County Attorney 
CERTJFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondents were served this «V6k day of March, 1983, 
on the office of Phil L. Hansen, Hansen an Hansen, 800 Boston 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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